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The Perception of the Integration of  
North and South Korea  
Woo-Young Lee & Hayeon Lee ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Sichtweisen auf einen Zusammenschluss von Nord- und Südko-
rea«. This study describes South Koreans’ general perceptions of the integration 
of North and South Korea through a survey of 500 adults living in South Korea. 
The following multiple-choice questions were asked: one’s general ideas about 
the integration of North and South Korea; the type of Korean reunification 
which is mostly supported/opposed; the type of Korean reunification which is 
most probable; and the pros and cons of reunification as well as necessary fac-
tors for reunification. Furthermore, we examined the differences in the percep-
tion of Korean reunification among the subgroup based on participants’ demo-
graphic information (i.e., gender, age, political orientation). The main results are 
as follows. First, the most representative thought on integration was “geo-
graphical integration of the Korean Peninsula,” followed by “establishment of 
economic partnerships or communities” and “restoration of common identity.” 
Meanwhile, there were differences among participants with regard to the de-
tailed representation of Korean reunification. It suggests that when the atti-
tudes toward integration of North and South Korea society are discussed, dif-
ferences in the perception among people should be considered. 
Keywords: Social integration, Korean reunification, integration of Korean 
minds. 
1. Introduction 
There is a growing interest in the integration of North and South Korea as the 
relations between the two countries has improved since the 2018 PyeongChang 
Olympics. How could Korean reunification be possible at the sociocultural 
level? More importantly, how could an integration of Korean minds be possible 
among those who make up the integrated Korean society? To answer these 
                                                             
∗
  Woo-Young Lee, University of North Korean Studies, 2, Bukchon-ro 15-gil, Jongno-gu, 
03053 Seoul, Republic of Korea; wylee@kyungnam.ac.kr (corresponding author). 
Hayeon Lee, University of North Korean Studies, 2, Bukchon-ro 15-gil, Jongno-gu, 03053 
Seoul, Republic of Korea; hylee@kyungnam.ac.kr. 
 This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the 
Korean Government (NRF-2017S1A3A2065782). 
The study was conducted with Kyungnam University IRB approval (IRB 1040460-A-2018-
007). 
HSR 44 (2019) 4  │  294 
questions, it is necessary to consider the general perception of the integration of 
North and South Korea among its members. The questions regarding how 
people perceive the integration of two Korean societies (e.g., whether various 
subgroups in each society – categorized, for example, by members’ demo-
graphic information – have similar or different attitudes on the Korean reunifi-
cation, whether or not members of subgroups have different attitudes toward 
the Korean reunification, and how we can resolve the conflict among intra and 
intergroup difference in society) serve as the stepping stones toward the under-
standing of the perception of Korean reunification and give direction toward 
the integration of Korean minds. In this research, our major purpose is describ-
ing the perception of the Korean reunification among South Koreans.  
The perceptions of Korean reunification can be understood through various 
dimensions, for example North and South Korean’s beliefs regarding each 
other (i.e., stereotypes toward one another North and South Korean or their 
attitudes toward the social system (e.g., political or economic system) of North 
and South Korea; the perceptions about the inter-Korean relations; and the 
attitudes and expectations regarding Korean reunification. Most previous re-
search (e.g., Chun and Jo 2000; Hai-sook Kim 2002; Yoon and Chae 2010) 
focused on the stereotype and prejudice of North and South Koreans toward 
each other. In addition, there are representative surveys conducted annually 
which asked people for their perceptions and attitudes toward Korean reunifica-
tion. First, the survey about Korean reunification conducted by the Korea Insti-
tute for National Unification (2017) asked participants the following questions: 
their general attitude toward Korea reunification (“How necessary do you think 
Korean reunification is?”), their specific attitudes and emotional responses 
toward reunification (e.g., “Although North and South Koreans share a com-
mon ethnic identity, it is not necessary to construct one country”; “I am com-
fortable when I am thinking about the reunification”), and their behavioral 
intentions in relation to reunification (e.g., “I am in favor of raising taxes for 
the reunification”). Participants answered those questions on a scale from 1 to 5 
(1 = not at all ~ 5 = very much). Participants also choose the items mostly 
correspondent with their opinion about the processes of Korean reunification; 
for example, the timeframe for reunification (“need not be unified vs. pursue by 
adjusting the speed vs. as soon as possible”), preferred method for reunification 
(“gradual unification by negotiation vs. radical unification by emergency situa-
tion vs. other”), reason for reunification (e.g., “because North and South Kore-
an shared common ethnic identity”), and necessary conditions for reunification 
(e.g., “improvement of North Korea’s economic status”). The second survey is 
about the perception of Korean reunification, conducted by the Institute for 
Peace and Unification Studies (2018). This survey also asked participants about 
their general attitude toward Korean reunification (“How necessary do you 
think reunification between the North and South Korea?”; 1 = not at all ~ 5 = 
very much), followed by specific perceptions of reunification similar with the 
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Korea Institute for National Unification’s survey on Korean reunification. They 
originally asked participants about their perceptions and attitudes toward a 
political system for an integrative society of North and South Korea (e.g., 
“based on the system of North Korea vs. South Korea; compromised system of 
North and South Korea”). 
The two surveys attempted to quantify attitudes toward Korean reunification 
in addition to some specific aspects and methods of the integration. Based on 
these surveys, researchers can describe and summarize the numeric data from 
participants and examine statistical hypotheses about the differences between 
participants based on their characteristics (e.g., gender, age, educational back-
ground) and the relations among variables. However, there are limitations for 
understanding the perceptions of various forms of Korean reunification among 
people and the attitudes toward it because which type of reunification is repre-
sentative in people’s minds cannot be verified. For example, it is not possible 
to identify through the above questions what South Koreans generally think the 
“reunification of the North and South Koreas” is – whether they consider it as a 
geographical integration on the Korean Peninsula, the construction of one 
political and economic systems of Korea, or social and cultural integration of 
North and South Koreans. Those aspects of Korean reunification could occur 
independently rather than simultaneously (Cha 2000). In addition, specifically 
when regarding the integration of the political and social systems of the two 
Koreas, it is possible that respondents have different attitudes (e.g., preference, 
perceived feasibility, and behavioral attention) toward each process and the 
outcomes of Korean reunification. Therefore, in the interpretation of previous 
research, one should consider the possibility that each participant responded 
based on their own perceptions. In fact, there are in-depth analyses based on 
the above surveys which compared the attitudes of North and South Koreans 
toward Korean reunification (Kim and Choi 2012), and other research exam-
ined the effect of demographic factors on the perception of legitimacy and 
feasibility of Korean reunification among South Koreans (Lee 2014). Both 
pieces of research had the limitation that they used answers to questions about 
general attitudes toward Korean reunification without specifying the type and 
manner of reunification. In other words, it is possible to interpret these findings 
from various angles, such as whether differences in the region, age, or political 
orientation predict attitudes toward reunification, or whether variations of the 
attitudes are the result of differences in the perception of reunification in ac-
cordance with individual demographic factors. 
In addition, the various perceptions of Korean reunification among commu-
nity members are limited when constructing common themes about the integra-
tion of Korean society at the community level. Perceptions of reunification 
among people can be different depending on the ideology, political and eco-
nomic status of individuals, and the perception of situational factors such as 
changes in inter-Korean relations. Hence, in order to discuss the perceptions of 
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reunification, it is necessary to first analyze people's various perceptions and 
attitudes toward those aspects (Kim 2001). Furthermore, if there are different 
perceptions of Korean reunification between members in society, there is the 
possibility of conflict between subgroups resulting from a lack of understand-
ing for differences in perception (Kang 2004). Therefore, it is necessary for 
constructing the social agreement of Korean reunification to verify the concrete 
perceptions of inter-Korean integration by members of society and identify 
commonalities and differences between the perceptions that exist within each 
subgroup.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no empirical study 
dealing with the various perceptions and attitudes regarding Korean reunifica-
tion. In this research, we tried to understand the perception of Korean reunifica-
tion and to verify whether the contents and attitudes of the perception of reuni-
fication differ in South Koreans depending on demographic variables such as 
age, gender, and political orientation. Specifically, we obtained a more detailed 
understanding of the perception of Korean reunification by asking what they 
generally think about reunification between North and South Korea, their atti-
tudes toward each type of reunification (i.e., constructing one country, federa-
tion, or national union), why they support or oppose reunification, and what is 
required for reunification. Each question had various response options to facili-
tate an accurate expression of participants thought. Participants were then cate-
gorized according to their age, gender, and political orientation and we ana-
lyzed whether there were statistical differences in responses between 
subgroups. The following section details the methods and results of this study. 
2. Participants 
Five hundred people (250 female, age mean = 39.75, SD = 11.03) living in 
South Korea were recruited via an online survey with monetary rewards.
1
 The 
demographic information of participants (age and gender distribution) is shown 
in Table 1 (Online Appendix).
2
 The survey was conducted in March 2018, after 
the PyeongChang Olympics. 
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2  
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3. Measures 
The Perception of Korean Reunification 
To understand the perception of Korean reunification, the question “What do 
you think the reunification of North and South Korea is?” was asked with nine 
possible answers. Participants selected three items which corresponded with 
their opinions. The nine items were as follows: (1) geographical integration on 
the Korean Peninsula; (2) establishment of a single political system; (3) estab-
lishment of economic communities; (4) expansion of social and cultural ex-
changes; (5) restoration of common ethnic identity; (6) psychological harmony 
between North and South Koreans; (7) South Korea’s absorption of North 
Korea; (8) North Korea’s absorption of South Korea; and (9) other (open-
ended).  
Most Preferred or Opposed Type of Reunification 
To identify the most preferred or opposed type of reunification, we asked two 
questions: “What type of reunification do you prefer?” and “What type of reu-
nification do you oppose?” We presented five choices for each question, from 
which participants selected the one that most closely matched their opinion. 
The choices presented were as follows: (1) establishment of a single political 
system based on South Korea; (2) establishment of a single political system 
based on North Korea; (3) establishment of a single state through a federation 
between North and South Korean governments; (4) a union of the nation be-
tween North and South Korea; and (5) other (open-ended). 
Most Feasible Type of Reunification 
To determine perceptions of the type of reunification most likely to occur, we 
asked: “What kind of reunification do you think is most likely happened in the 
current situation?” We presented five choices to the participants that were 
similar to the aforementioned questions (the most preferred or opposed type of 
reunification) to participants and asked them to select the one that most corre-
sponded with their opinion.  
Reasons for Supporting Reunification 
To determine why participants support Korean reunification, we asked: “Why 
do you think North and South Korea need to be unified?” We presented nine 
choices, from which respondents selected the three that were closest to their 
opinions. The views presented were as follows: (1) because we are one group 
as ‘Han-ethnicity’; (2) to eliminate the threat of war; (3) to make Korea a 
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stronger country; (4) to resolve the problems of separated families; (5) to im-
prove the life of North Koreans; (6) to contribute to world peace; (7) because 
the majority of Koreans wants reunification; (8) for no particular reason; and 
(9) other (open-ended). 
Reasons for Opposing Reunification 
To determine why participants oppose Korean reunification, we asked: “Why 
do you think the two Koreas should not be unified?” We presented nine choic-
es, from which respondents selected the three that were closest to their opin-
ions. The views presented were as follows: (1) North and South Korea have 
had different histories for too long; (2) there is no possibility of war between 
North and South Korea; (3) reunification interferes with South Korea becoming 
a stronger country; (4) aversion to the North Korean regime; (5) the financial 
burden of the South Koreans for reunification; (6) the state of division is favor-
able to maintaining power-order of the world; (7) many people do not want 
reunification; (8) no particular reason; and (9) other (open-ended). 
Necessary Factors for Reunification 
To determine the factors necessary for reunification, we asked: “What do you 
think is necessary for reunification?” We presented nine choices, from which 
respondents selected the three that were closest to their opinions. The views 
presented were as follows: (1) improvement in North Korea’s politi-
cal/economic situation; (2) improvement in South Korea’s political/economic 
situation; (3) improvement in South Koreans’ perceptions of reunification; (4) 
improvement in North Koreans’ perceptions of reunification; (5) establishment 
of peaceful relations between North and South Korea; (6) international agree-
ment by China, the United States, and so on; (7) expansion of political and 
economic exchanges between North and South Korea; (8) expansion of inter-
Korean social/cultural/interpersonal exchanges; and (9) other (open-ended). 
Once the responses to the main questions were completed, participants re-
sponded to a question on their political orientation (1 = liberal to 7 = conserva-
tive). The survey ended with questions about their place of birth, age, occupa-
tion, and academic background.  
4. Results 
Demographic Information of Participants 
Of the participants, 38.8% were from Seoul and 16.4% from the capital area 
(Gyeonggi). Other major cities (Busan, Daegu, and Incheon) followed with 6 to 
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7% each. There was no statistically significant difference in cross-analysis in 
place of birth based on gender and age group (ps > .282). 
The mean (M) of the political orientation of participants was 3.63 and stand-
ard deviation (SD) was 1.40. There was no statistically significant difference in 
the level of political orientation by age group, p = .095. Male responses (M = 
3.87, SD = 1.45), however, indicated they were more conservative than females 
(M = 3.40, SD = 1.31), F (1,498) = 14.31, p < .001. Meanwhile, we checked the 
score distribution to form a subcategory of respondents’ overall political orien-
tation. The percentages for liberal (one to three-point response), moderate 
(four-point response), and conservative (five to seven-point response) were 
43.5%, 33.8%, and 22.7%, respectively. There was no statistically significant 
difference in the response rates for liberal, moderate, and conservative orienta-
tions by age group, p = .481, but there was a statistically significant difference 
in the response rates for liberal, moderate, and conservative orientations by 
gender, (2)= 19.63, p < .001. Specifically, the response rates for liberal, 
moderate, and conservative political orientations among males were 43.9%, 
45.2%, and 67.8%, respectively. Among females, the response rates for liberal, 
moderate, and conservative political orientations were 56.1%, 54.8%, and 
32.2%, respectively. There was a gap between males and females in the re-
sponse rate for the conservative orientation.  
In the analysis of main questions, we described the results of participants’ 
overall responses, as well as whether the response rates and details varied ac-
cording to age group (the 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s), gender (male, female), and politi-
cal orientation (liberal, moderate, conservative). (See Appendix for the full 
results of this question and the results for age group, gender, and political ori-
entation.)
3
 To compare the response rates according to age group, gender, and 
political orientation, a chi-square test (and a chi-square test for multiple re-
sponses) was performed based on the question.  
The Perception of Korean Reunification 
The most common idea associated with Korean reunification was the “end of 
geographical division on the Korean Peninsula” (average 57.5%), followed by 
“establishment of an economic partnership or community” (average 47.1%) 
and “restoring the common ethnic identity of the two Koreas” (average 48.4%). 
The differences in response rates by age, gender, and political orientation were 
statistically significant, age group (24) = 36.40, p = .050, gender (8) = 
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17.76, p = .023, political orientation (16) = 34.79, p = .004. Descriptions of 
each analysis are as follows.  
First, by age group, those in their 20s thought of reunification as the “end of 
geographical division on the Korean Peninsula” (average 56.0%), the “estab-
lishment of a single political community” (average 46.0%), and the “expansion 
and integration of social and cultural exchanges” (average 46.0%). The re-
sponse rates were low for “restoration of common ethnic identity” (average 
39.0%) and “establishment of economic communities” (40.0%). Meanwhile, 
for those in their 30s-50s, the second and third most common responses were 
“restoration of common ethnic identity” (average 51.5%) and “establishment of 
economic communities” (average 49.5%). This can be interpreted as a reduced 
awareness in people in their 20s of “restoration of common ethnic identity” or 
“establishment of economic communities” as compared to those in their 30s-
50s.  
Next, by gender, the most frequent response for both males and females was 
“end of geographical division on the Korean Peninsula” (average 58.0%); 
however, there were differences in their second and third most frequent re-
sponses. Males responded in the order of “establishment of economic commu-
nities” (average 49.6%) and “restoration of common ethnic identity” (average 
46.8%), while females responded in the order of “restoration of an ethnic iden-
tity” (average 50.8%) and “expansion of social and cultural exchanges” (aver-
age 49.6%).  
Next, by political orientation, the response rates for liberal, moderate, and 
conservative groups were all in the order of “end of geographical division” 
(average 58.9%), “restoration of common ethnic identity” (average 49.2%), and 
“expansion of social and cultural exchanges” (average 47.7%). For “psycholog-
ical harmony between North and South Koreans,” however, the response rate 
was lower in conservatives (20.3%) than in liberals and moderates (average 
36.5%). For “South Korea’s absorption of North Korea” (35.6%) and “North 
Korea’s absorption of South Korea” (9.3%), the response rate was higher in 
conservatives than in liberals and moderates (24.6% and 2.6%, respectively). 
Thus, conservatives are less likely to recognize reunification as serving the 
purpose of “psychological harmony between North and South Koreans” than 
liberals or moderates, whereas they are more likely to perceive reunification as 
the absorption of one country by the other.  
Most Preferred Type of Reunification 
The most preferred type of reunification was “establishment of a single politi-
cal system based on South Korea” (average 56.9%). The second highest was 
“establishment of a single state through a federation between North and South 
Korean governments” (average 25.6%). In this analysis, the difference in re-
sponse rates by age group was statistically significant, (9)= 17.26 and p 
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= .045. Specifically, for those in their 20s, the response rate for “establishment 
of a single political system based on South Korea; (2) establishment of a single 
political system based on North Korea” (average 71.7%) was more than three 
times that of the second highest, “establishment of a single state through a 
federation between North and South Korean governments ” (average 18.2%). 
However, for those in their 30s-50s, the response rate for “establishment of a 
single political system based on South Korea” (average 52.0%) was about half 
that of the total responses. The response rate for “establishment of a single state 
through a federation between North and South Korean governments” (average 
28.1%), which was half that of the most frequent response, ranked second. This 
means that the most preferred type of reunification was almost the same among 
those in their’ 20s (South Korean system-based unification). However, people 
in their 30s-50s can be interpreted as having relatively diverse opinions (federal 
system, national union, etc.) on Korean reunification.  
Most Opposed Type of Reunification 
The most opposed type of unification was “establishment of a single political 
system based on North Korea” (average 76.4%). In this analysis, the difference 
in response rates by gender and political orientation was significant (gender (3)= 8.01, p = .046, political orientation (6) = 12.58, p = .050). By gen-
der, for males and females alike, the primary response was “establishment of a 
single political system based on North Korea.” However, females opposed this 
type of reunification more vociferously (average 81.9%) than males (average 
71.6%). The analysis based on political orientation showed that the primary 
response for liberal, moderate, and conservative was “establishment of a single 
political system based on North Korea.” However, liberals (81.8%) had a high-
er response rate for “establishment of a single political system based on North 
Korea” than conservatives (average 71.8%). In other words, female and liberal 
South Koreans are most likely to be opposed to reunification based on the 
North Korean regime.  
Most Feasible Type of Reunification 
The type of reunification respondents considered most likely was “establish-
ment of a single state through a federation between North and South Korean 
governments” (average 33.7%). This was followed by “a union of the nation 
between North and South Korea” (average 30.9%), and “establishment of a 
single political system based on South Korea” (average 30.7%). For this ques-
tion, there was no statistically significant difference in response rates by age, 
gender, or political orientation, ps > .118. Thus, South Koreans see these ways 
of reunification as equally feasible regardless of their age, gender, or political 
orientation.  
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Reasons for Supporting Reunification 
The highest response rate among the reasons why the two Koreas should 
achieve reunification was “to eliminate the threat of war” (average 78.6%). 
This was followed by “because we are one group as ‘Han-ethnicity’” (average 
53.1%), and “to make Korea a stronger country” (average 52.6%). Analysis of 
the difference in response rates by age group showed that the overall difference 
was not significant, p = .200. However, for the answer “because we are one 
group as ‘Han-ethnicity,’” those in their 20s (average 40.0%) showed a lower 
response rate than those in their 30s-50s (average 57.4%). This is a result con-
sistent with the response rate for “restoration of common ethnic identity,” 
which was lower for those in their 20s than in their 30s-50s.  
Differences in response rates by gender and political orientation were statis-
tically significant (gender (8) = 18.41, p = .018, political orientation (16) 
= 32.34 and p = .009). A summary of each analysis is as follows. First, for 
males and females, the same responses ranked first to third: “to eliminate the 
threat of war,” “because we are one group as ‘Han-ethnicity,’” and “to make 
Korea a stronger country.” Meanwhile, for “to resolve the problems of separat-
ed families,” the response rate of females (average 44.8%) was higher than that 
of males (average 36.0%). The answer “for no particular reason,” had a higher 
response rate for men (average 6.4%) than women (average 2.0%). Second, the 
analysis based on political orientation also showed that liberals, conservatives, 
and moderates had the same order of responses from first to third. However, for 
“to eliminate the threat of war,” moderates (average 86.3%) had a higher re-
sponse rate than conservatives (average 68.6%). On the contrary, for “to im-
prove the life of North Koreans,” conservatives (average 37.3%) had a higher 
response rate than moderates (average 23.8%). 
Reasons for Opposing Reunification 
The highest response rate among the reasons why the two Koreas should not 
achieve reunification was for “aversion to the North Korean regime” (average 
85.4%). This was followed by “the financial burden of the South Koreans for 
reunification” (average 81.1%) and “North and South Korea have had different 
histories for too long” (average 66.7%). In this question, the difference in re-
sponse rates by political orientation was statistically significant, (16	)= 
34.84, p = .004. Specifically, the answer “aversion to the North Korean re-
gime” has a higher response rate among liberals (average 90.2%) than con-
servatives (average 77.1%). As for “there is no possibility of war between 
North and South Korea”, moderates (average 14.9) had a higher response rate 
than liberals (average 6.1%). Most liberal South Koreans oppose reunification 
because of an “aversion to the North Korean regime” and the percentage of 
people who think “there is no possibility of war” is relatively low.  
HSR 44 (2019) 4  │  303 
Based on the fact that the response rate for the top three answers was ap-
proximately 78%, we could infer that reasons for why the two Koreas should 
not achieve reunification were relatively converged. Also, the third most com-
mon answer, “North and South Korea have had different histories for too long,” 
can be seen as contradicting the second most common answer, “because we are 
one group as ‘Han-ethnicity’” among pro-reunification reasons. Although 
South Koreans believe they share a common identity with North Koreans, they 
simultaneously feel an aversion to North Korea because of the fact that they 
have experienced different historical events over the past 70 years. 
Necessary Factors for Reunification 
The highest response rate for factors required for unification was for “im-
provement in North Korea’s political/economic situation” (average 67.3%). 
This was followed by “establishment of peaceful relations between North and 
South Korea” (average 47.4%) and “expansion of political and economic ex-
changes between North and South Korea” (average 37.8%). In this question 
also, the differences in response rates by age group, gender, and political orien-
tation were all statistically significant: age group (24) = 47.28, p =.003; 
gender (8) = 37.04, p < .001; and political orientation (16) = 28.61, p 
= .027. Descriptions of each analysis are as follows.  
First, by age group, those in their 20s responded in the order: “improvement 
in North Korea’s political/economic situation” (average 78.0%), “improvement 
in North Koreans’ perceptions of reunification” (average 48.0%), and “interna-
tional agreement by China, the United States, and so on” (average 45.0%). 
Response rates for “establishment of peaceful relations between North and 
South Korea” (average 41.0%) and “expansion of political and economic ex-
changes” (average 28.0%) were relatively low. Among those in their 30s-50s, 
the following were the second and third highest responses: “establishment of 
peaceful relations” (average 49.5%) and “expansion of political and economic 
exchanges” (average 41.1%). In sum, there was a difference between those in 
their 20s and those in their 30s-50s with regard to what was considered a re-
quirement for reunification. Those in their 20s were relatively more concerned 
about changes in North Korea (political/economic situation and improved 
perceptions) than people in their 30s-50s, who were concerned with inter-
Korean exchanges and improved relations between two nations. 
Next, by gender, males and females both ranked “improvement in North Ko-
rea’s political/economic situation” (average 66.8%) first, with the second high-
est response being “establishment of peaceful state relations” (average 49.0%). 
However, there were differences in the third highest response: while for men it 
was “international agreement by China, the United States, and so on” (39.6%), 
it was “expansion of political and economic exchanges” (40.8%) for women. In 
addition, women (36.0%) had a higher response rate than men (22.4%) for 
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“expansion of inter-Korean social/cultural/interpersonal exchanges.” In other 
words, women consider direct exchanges between the two Koreas a require-
ment for reunification.  
Next, by political orientation, liberals, moderates, and conservatives all 
ranked the following first and second: “improvement in North Korea’s politi-
cal/economic situation” (average 66.9%) and “establishment of peaceful rela-
tions” (average 48.7%). However, there was a difference in the third highest 
response, with liberals responding with “expansion of political and economic 
exchanges” (average 43.5%), moderates responding with “improvement in 
North Koreans’ perceptions of reunification” (average 38.1%), and conserva-
tives responding with “international agreement by China, the United States, and 
so on” (average 42.4%). In addition, for “expansion of inter-Korean so-
cial/cultural/interpersonal exchanges,” liberals (average 35.0%) showed a high-
er response rate than moderates and conservatives (average 23.9%). In sum, 
liberals consider direct inter-Korean exchanges (political/economic, so-
cial/culture/interpersonal) the main requirement for reunification when com-
pared to other political orientations.  
5. Discussions  
In this study, we sought to understand the general perceptions of Korean reuni-
fication and verify whether these perceptions varied according to demographic 
variables such as age, gender, and political orientation. We surveyed 500 adults 
living in South Korea about their ideas of “Korea reunification,” their attitudes 
toward each type of reunification, and reasons for favoring/opposing reunifica-
tion and as well as the requirements for it. We provided multiple choices for 
each question, allowing them to choose more than one. By doing so, we exam-
ined South Koreans’ perceptions of integration between North and South Korea 
in more specific terms.  
The main results of this study are summarized as follows. First, with regard 
to the general idea of reunification, “end of geographical division on the Kore-
an Peninsula” was the dominant answer regardless of age, gender, and political 
orientation. However, people in their 30s-50s mostly chose “restoration of 
common ethnic identity” and “establishment of economic partnerships or 
communities” as Korean reunification, but those in their 20s showed relatively 
low levels for this perception. This result was similar to the reasons given for 
favoring reunification. One of the reasons for favoring reunification, “because 
we are one group as ‘Han-ethnicity,’” had a lower response rate for those in 
their 20s than those in their 30s-50s. This suggests that South Koreans in their 
20s actually care less about the common ethnic identity of the North and South 
Koreas than those in their 30s-50s.  
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Meanwhile, the most preferred type of reunification was that based on the 
South Korean system. Those in their 20s had a response rate over 70% while 
those in their 30s-50s showed a rate of around 50%. The rest of those in their 
30s-50s preferred other types of reunification, such as the federal system 
(around 28%) or the national union (around 14%). This suggests that different 
age groups have different preferences for reunification models. Meanwhile, the 
type of reunification South Koreans most strongly oppose is that based on the 
North Korean regime. While females and liberals tended to show the highest 
response rates in this regard, more than 70% of all respondents were against 
unification based on the North Korean system. Also noteworthy is that, unlike 
the type of reunification participants most preferred or opposed, the most feasi-
ble type of reunification showed an even response rate around 30% for the 
federation, national union, and South Korean system-based reunification. There 
were also no differences in response rates based on age, gender, or political 
orientation for the most feasible type of reunification. Various interpretations 
are possible with regard to this. The assessment of the feasibility of a particular 
event may depend on the circumstances or social context in which the actual 
event is occurring rather than on the demographic factors of an individual. It 
may also depend on how members access relevant information about the event. 
Therefore, future research should examine the factors that affect the perceived 
feasibility of Korean reunification and suggest how an agreement between 
various perceptions of Korean reunification among the society members could 
be made. 
Finally, on why people supported or opposed Korea reunification, the most 
popular reason for the support of reunification was “to eliminate the threat of 
war”; for the opposition, it was “aversion to the North Korean regime.” Also 
noteworthy is that the second reason for supporting Korean reunification was 
“because we are one group as ‘Han-ethnicity’” and the third reason for oppos-
ing Korean reunification was “North and South Korea have had different histo-
ries for too long.” This suggests that South Koreans simultaneously experience 
alienation and familiarity with regard to North Korea; they are conscious of the 
different historical experiences since the division even though they recognize 
that they shared common in-group identity. Expanding on this, when emphasiz-
ing the reason for reunification, it is necessary to stress the common ethnic 
identity between North and South Koreans as well as accurately identifying the 
differences in historical and cultural experiences in order to reduce their aver-
sion to each other. In other words, for an integrated society and culture, it is 
necessary for the people from the two countries to understand and respect the 
differences among each other.  
In sum, regarding South Koreans’ general perceptions of integration of 
North and South Korea, it was confirmed that there were differences in how 
people think of reunification and the belief toward specific aspects of reunifica-
tion depending on age, gender, and political orientation. Future research is 
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necessary to expand the results of this study to include teenagers and senior 
citizens in South Korea as well as North Korea. Also, it is possible to analyze 
longitudinal data to verify whether perceptions of North and South Korean 
integration are maintained or changed at various time points depending on the 
rapidly changing situation between the two Koreas. In addition, while this 
study focused on the perceptions of Korean reunification, future studies could 
further focus on the interpretation of inter-Korean relations (hostile rivalry and 
antagonism vs. friendly partner for cooperation, governance, support, or assis-
tance vs. partner with equal status and common identity) as well as check the 
details of mutual recognition and attitudes toward each other. Given the fact 
that the perceptions of integration may vary depending on the interpretation of 
inter-Korean relations or the influence of mutual recognition and attitudes 
between the South and North, identifying the content of perceptions and verify-
ing the correlations among various factors could be the focus of future re-
search.  
Furthermore, in addition to demographic factors and political orientation, it 
is necessary to seek the psychological variables which affect the perception of 
integration of North and South Korea as well as other related attitudes. By 
exploring individual differences that consist of political attitudes (e.g., univer-
sal values; Kim, Park, and Park 2015; Schwartz, Caprara and Vecchione 2010) 
or level of common in-group identity between two countries (e.g., ‘Han-
ethnicity’ identification; Yang 2009), it is possible to suggest a direction that 
allows members of society to form a shared belief about Korea reunification. 
Universal values (Schwartz 1992, 1994), for example, which represent the 
general beliefs regarding the desirable end states (e.g., benevolence, universal-
ism, power, achievement) can be seen to affect the perceptions of the integra-
tion of North and South Korea. It can also be inferred that one’s general ideas 
about and preference of/opposition to a certain type of reunification will 
change depending on the level of common in-group identity between the North 
and South Korea. We can predict that with high levels of identification on the 
common in-group identity (‘Han-ethnicity’) of North and South Koreans, peo-
ple will more prefer the form of reunification based on a single country or 
political and social system. Future studies need to verify the effectiveness of 
these psychological variables in recognition of the integration of North and 
South Korea.  
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